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Privatisierung und Bankperformance

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  • Stephan Paul
  • Laura Kästner

Abstract

Following the controversial discussion on banking industry's performance, this study analyses the main driving forces of banks and banking systems profitability: Are performance differences primarily due to country specific institutional attributes (here related to ownership structures in the European banking industries) or structural characteristics of the banking system (aligned to consolidation and concentration processes in banking markets), or can they mainly be attributed to bank specific, strategic features expressed by financial ratios? Using recursive partitioning, the sample of around 3,000 European banks is successively divided by the most discriminatory predictor with regard to the dependent variable return on equity in as homogenous sub-segments as possible. The algorithm chooses the institutional characteristic ownership of savings banks as the most selective input factor. Banks located in countries with at least first privatization success indicate a significant higher profitability than banks resident in countries with public dominated savings banks sectors. Anknüpfend an die kontrovers geführte Diskussion über die Performance der Kreditwirtschaft in Deutschland geht dieser Beitrag auf Basis einer empirischen Analyse der Frage nach den Haupteinflussfaktoren der Rentabilität von Banken und Bankensystemen in Europa nach: Lassen sich Performanceunterschiede im Wesentlichen auf institutionelle oder strukturelle länderspezifische Systemmerkmale zurückführen, die insbesondere an divergierenden Eigentumsstrukturen bzw. Konsolidierungs- und Konzentrationsprozessen ansetzen? Oder prägen vielmehr bankindividuelle geschäftspolitische Merkmale die Rentabilität? Mittels rekursiver Partitionierung wird das Untersuchungssample bestehend aus 3000 europäischen Banken im Hinblick auf die ausgewählte Performance- Zielgröße "Eigenkapitalrendite" schrittweise anhand des jeweils trennschärfsten Inputfaktors in möglichst homogene Subsegmente unterteilt. Das vom Algorithmus als trennschärfstes Kriterium ausgewiesene institutionelle Merkmal "Eigentum an Sparkassen" separiert Banken aus Ländern mit Privatisierungserfolgen von Banken aus Ländern mit einem durch öffentliches Eigentum dominierten Sparkassensektor. Demnach weisen Banken aus Ländern mit ersten Privatisierungserfolgen signifikant höhere Renditen auf.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan Paul & Laura Kästner, 2006. "Privatisierung und Bankperformance," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 75(4), pages 33-52.
  • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:75-4-3
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.75.4.33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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