Fonds de retraite et performance:la famille compte-t-elle ?
(VF)Actuellement, la majorité des fonds mutuels ou des fonds de pension appartient à une famille. Une famille comprend les fonds gérés par la même société. Cet article s’intéresse à la performance des fonds de pension anglais à cotisations définies sur longue période. La performance est mesurée du point de vue de la famille de fonds. Ce changement de niveau d’analyse amène à s’interroger sur l’influence de la taille et donc de la complexité organisationnelle des sociétés de gestion de portefeuille sur leur performance. Autrement dit, les petites familles présentent-elles des performances supérieures à celles des grandes familles? (VA)Almost all mutual funds or pension funds belong to a family. A fund family includes all funds managed by the same fund management company. This paper studies the long-run performance of UK defined-contribution pension funds. Performance is measured with reference to the fund family. This approach leads to question the influence of size, and thus of organizational complexity, of fund management companies on their performance. In other words, do small families produce better performance than big families?
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