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Bribery game in government secondary schools in Cameroon: An empirical investigation of Banfield’s model

Author

Listed:
  • Siméon Maxime BIKOUE

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Cameroon)

  • Oscar Victor BAYEMI

    (Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Dschang, Cameroon)

Abstract

This paper investigates the bribery game in government secondary schools in Cameroon using Banfield’s model. The study analyzes the behavior of actors involved in bribery and the institutional factors that facilitate corruption. Empirical findings suggest that weak governance and lack of accountability contribute to the persistence of bribery in the education sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Siméon Maxime BIKOUE & Oscar Victor BAYEMI, 2020. "Bribery game in government secondary schools in Cameroon: An empirical investigation of Banfield’s model," Journal of Economic and Social Thought, EconSciences Journals, vol. 7(3), pages 110-124, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ3:v:7:y:2020:i:3:p:110-124
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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