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Institutional Inertia: Persistent Inefficient Institutions in Spain

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  • Espín-Sánchez, José-Antonio

Abstract

In 1966, after more than 700 years, the irrigation community in Mula (Spain) switched from auctions to quotas to allocate water from its river. This change happened in the absence of either political or technological change. Quotas were more efficient, but required that farmers own water property rights. I develop a model in which poor farmers cannot credibly commit to purchase water rights. I show that empirical evidence on savings and prices is consistent with this interpretation. A temporary increase in output prices in the 1950s and better financial institutions allowed farmers to accumulate savings and solve the commitment problem. “There is nothing more difficult to arrange, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through, than to initiate a new order of things.” Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince

Suggested Citation

  • Espín-Sánchez, José-Antonio, 2017. "Institutional Inertia: Persistent Inefficient Institutions in Spain," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(3), pages 692-723, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:77:y:2017:i:03:p:692-723_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2008. "Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 267-293, March.
    2. Samuel Garrido & Salvador Calatayud, 2011. "The price of improvements: agrarian contracts and agrarian development in nineteenth‐century eastern Spain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(2), pages 598-620, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Donna, Javier & Espin-Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "The Illiquidity of Water Markets," MPRA Paper 55078, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N23 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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