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Patent pools in light of European Union competition law

Author

Listed:
  • Anna Odrobina

    (Cracow University of Economics)

Abstract

The functioning of patent pools leads to specific benefits in the transfer of technologies, and it accelerates technological advancement and provides easy access to technologies. Therefore, one could expect that the European Union (EU) – an organization which attempts to gain competitive advantage of its economy on the basis of knowledge and technology – should support patent pools. However, due to the possibility of anti-competitive practices, the functioning of patent pools is subject to EU legislation and competition laws. In this context patent pools pose a challenge in the area of reconciling the process of supporting technological advancement with the protection of fair competition. The paper presents an analysis of EU regulations in the area of patent pools. The author assesses the pro- and anti-competitive effects of activities carried out by patent pools. The further part of the paper discusses an evolution of the EU’s approach to such organizations, presenting specific patent pool laws in the context of technology transfer agreements. Finally, the author presents some specific problems and future changes related to EU competition laws with respect to patent pools.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Odrobina, 2014. "Patent pools in light of European Union competition law," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 13(4), pages 523-532, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:13:y:2014:i:4:p:523-532
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2014.037
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "Efficient Patent Pools," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 691-711, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    legal patent pools; EU antitrust; technology transfer agreements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures

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