IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cpn/umkeip/v13y2014i3p389-402.html

Competition in politics

Author

Listed:
  • Marcin Kalinowski

    (University of Lodz)

Abstract

The article illustrates the competition in politics which takes place in two parallel dimensions, i.e. during regular electoral campaigns and during the period of debating the final version of the legislation. One of the ways to the appropriate treatment of competition in politics is focusing research efforts on the analysis of political entrepreneurs behavior. It involves obtaining an advantage over players aiming to achieve identical objectives through the use of various instruments which exert influence on the preferences of political consumers as well as public decision of politicians and bureaucrats. The author argues that these behaviors are an adjustment to the conditions in which competition takes place on the political market. The methodology adopted in the study based on the hypothesis that individuals make public choices thus affecting the final outcome of the political process, and a direct relationship between the private cost and private benefit, which is a fundamental feature of the market selection, can be transferred to the analysis of public sphere.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcin Kalinowski, 2014. "Competition in politics," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 13(3), pages 389-402, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:13:y:2014:i:3:p:389-402
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2014.028
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/EiP.2014.028
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.12775/EiP.2014.028?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Denzau, Arthur T. & Munger, Michael C., 1986. "Legislators and Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 89-106, March.
    2. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
    3. Austen-Smith, David, 1995. "Campaign Contributions and Access," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(3), pages 566-581, September.
    4. Austen-Smith, David & Feddersen, Timothy J., 2006. "Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and Voting Rules," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 100(2), pages 209-217, May.
    5. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1996. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(2), pages 265-286.
    6. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Cotton, Christopher, 2012. "Pay-to-play politics: Informational lobbying and contribution limits when money buys access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 369-386.
    2. Stadelmann, David & Torrens, Gustavo, 2020. "Who is the ultimate boss of legislators: Voters, special interest groups or parties?," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224562, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 587-611, August.
    5. Michael Dorsch, 2013. "Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 211-228, June.
    6. Vyacheslav Dombrovsky, 2008. "Campaign Contributions and Firm Performance: The “Latvian Way”," SSE Riga/BICEPS Research Papers 2, Baltic International Centre for Economic Policy Studies (BICEPS);Stockholm School of Economics in Riga (SSE Riga).
    7. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Campaigns, political mobility, and communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
    8. Lopez Edward J. & Jewell R. Todd & Campbell Noel D., 2009. "Pass a Law, Any Law, Fast! State Legislative Responses to the Kelo Backlash," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 101-135, April.
    9. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    10. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    12. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2012. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-134/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    13. Zara Sharif & Otto H. Swank, 2019. "Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?," De Economist, Springer, vol. 167(2), pages 127-143, June.
    14. Le, Thanh & Yalcin, Erkan, 2018. "Lobbying, campaign contributions, and electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 559-572.
    15. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2013. "When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 336-351, December.
    16. Juan Carlos Berganza, 2000. "Politicians, voters and electoral processes: an overview," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(3), pages 501-543, September.
    17. Cotton, Christopher, 2009. "Should we tax or cap political contributions? A lobbying model with policy favors and access," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 831-842, August.
    18. Bekkouche, Yasmine & Cagé, Julia & Dewitte, Edgard, 2022. "The heterogeneous price of a vote: Evidence from multiparty systems, 1993–2017," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    19. Patrick Balles & Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2024. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(662), pages 2290-2320.
    20. Fergusson, Leopoldo, 2014. "Media markets, special interests, and voters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 13-26.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:13:y:2014:i:3:p:389-402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Miroslawa Buczynska (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.wydawnictwoumk.pl .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.