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Tax system competition – instruments and beneficiaries

Author

Listed:
  • Krzysztof Biernacki

    (Wroclaw University of Economics)

Abstract

Tax competition among states and jurisdictions has already been examined many times in the economic literature. However, the main scope of the research was focused on a tax rates competition in income taxes and its consequences in bringing direct investments. This scripture/commentary tries to analyze various instruments and beneficiaries of the tax system competition and provide a general overview on this subject.

Suggested Citation

  • Krzysztof Biernacki, 2014. "Tax system competition – instruments and beneficiaries," Ekonomia i Prawo, Uniwersytet Mikolaja Kopernika, vol. 13(2), pages 275-284, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpn:umkeip:v:13:y:2014:i:2:p:275-284
    DOI: 10.12775/EiP.2014.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(6), pages 763-772, November.
    2. Nika Sokol, 2008. "Corporate Tax Systems and Tax Competitition in the EU New Member States," Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Zagreb, vol. 11(2), pages 81-94, November.
    3. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax competition; tax system; fiscal harmonization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies

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