Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes : The Private Ownership of Monopoly In General Equilibrium
In an earlier paper [Blackorby and Murty; 2007] we showed that if a monopoly sector is imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent, then unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are welfare-wise equivalent. In this paper, we consider private ownership of the monopoly sector. Given technical difficulties in making a direct general equilibrium comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation, we adopt a technique due to Guesnerie  and Quinzii  in a somewhat different context of increasing returns and non-convex economies to show that neither ad valorem taxation nor unit taxation Pareto dominates the other; although, generally, the two are not welfare-wise equivalent.
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- Charles Blackorby & Sushama Murty, 2010.
"Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly In General Equilibrium,"
1011, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
- Charles Blackorby & Sushama Murty, 2013. "Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly in General Equilibrium," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 547-579, 08.
- Blackorby, Charles & Murty, Sushama, 2007. "Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes : The Private Ownership of Monopoly In General Equilibrium," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 797, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Blackorby, Charles & Murty, Sushama, 2006.
"Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes : Monopoly In General Equilibrium,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
761, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Blackorby, Charles & Murty, Sushama, 2007. "Unit versus ad valorem taxes: Monopoly in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 817-822, April.
- Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(6), pages 763-772, November.
- Skeath, Susan E. & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-71, January.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780898718966 is not listed on IDEAS
- Guesnerie Roger & Laffont Jean-jacques, 1978.
"Taxing price makers,"
CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange)
- Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992.
"The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
- Sofia Delipalla & Michael Keen, 1991. "The Comparison Between Ad Valorem and Specific Taxation under Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 821, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37, February.
- Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, March.
- Blackorby, Charles & Diewert, W E, 1979. "Expenditure Functions, Local Duality, and Second Order Approximations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 579-601, May.
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