IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/rfreco/rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_17_3_1468.html

Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem

Author

Listed:
  • François Boldron

Abstract

[eng] In this paper, I propose a survey on the economic literature dealing with the balance between specific and ad vabrem taxation. Three lessons emerge from this literature. First, predominantly specific taxation leads to relatively high price and profits and a relatively low fiscal revenue. Second, no general rule indicate which type of taxation is the best instrument as this choice is closely link to the market structure and/or to the government's objective. Third, even if a lot of works have been done on this debate, there still exist many gaps to fill. [fre] L'objectif principal de cet article est de faire le point sur la littérature économique traitant du choix entre taxe ad valorem (taxe sur la valeur des ventes) et taxe unitaire (taxe sur le volume des ventes). Trois enseignements majeurs sont mis en évidence. Premièrement, une prédominance de la taxe unitaire conduit à des prix, des profits, une qualité relativement élevés, et une recette fiscale plutôt faible. Deuxièmement, il n'existe pas de règle générale permettant de statuer sur le choix du type de taxe à utiliser. En effet, ce choix est étroitement lié à la structure du marché étudié et à l'objectif poursuivi par le gouvernement. Troisièmement, même s'il y a eu beaucoup d'avancées, il existe encore de nombreuses zones d'ombres qui peuvent faire l'objet de travaux intéressants.

Suggested Citation

  • François Boldron, 2003. "Le choix entre taxe unitaire et taxe ad valorem," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 17(3), pages 109-128.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_17_3_1468
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.2003.1468
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2003.1468
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/rfeco.2003.1468
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_17_3_1468
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3406/rfeco.2003.1468?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kowalczyk, Carsten & Skeath, Susan E., 1994. "Pareto ranking optimal tariffs under foreign monopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 355-359.
    2. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-278, June.
    3. Francis K. Cheung, 1998. "Excise Tax on a Non-Uniform Pricing Monopoly: Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes Compared," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(5), pages 1192-1203, November.
    4. Constantatos, Christos & Sartzetakis, Eftichios S., 1999. "On commodity taxation in vertically differentiated markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(8), pages 1203-1217, November.
    5. Delipalla, Sophia & O'Donnell, Owen, 2001. "Estimating tax incidence, market power and market conduct: The European cigarette industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 885-908, May.
    6. Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992. "The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
    7. Guesnerie, Roger & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1978. "Taxing price makers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 423-455, December.
    8. Reinhorn Leslie J., 2005. "Optimal Taxation with Cournot Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-29, October.
    9. Michael Keen, 1998. "The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37, February.
    10. Gareth Myles, 1996. "Imperfect competition and the optimal combination of ad valorem and specific taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(1), pages 29-44, January.
    11. Cremer, Helmuth & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1994. "Commodity Taxation in a Differentiated Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(3), pages 613-633, August.
    12. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
    13. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring.
    14. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1995. "Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 85-100, January.
    15. Besley, Timothy, 1989. "Commodity taxation and imperfect competition : A note on the effects of entry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 359-367, December.
    16. Cremer, Helmuth & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1999. "On the taxation of polluting products in a differentiated industry," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 575-594, March.
    17. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Norbert Ladoux, 1999. "La taxation des biens polluants," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 14(2), pages 33-60.
    18. D. B. Suits & R. A. Musgrave, 1953. "Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes Compared," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 67(4), pages 598-604.
    19. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Optimal taxation of a non-linear pricing monopolist," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 137-155, July.
    20. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1977. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 297-308, June.
    21. Skeath, Susan E. & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-71, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. François Boldron & Cyril Hariton, 2003. "Access charge and imperfect competition," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 69(3), pages 319-340.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre & Kreider, Brent, 2001. "The efficiency of indirect taxes under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 231-251, August.
    2. Auerbach, Alan J. & Hines, James Jr., 2002. "Taxation and economic efficiency," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 21, pages 1347-1421, Elsevier.
    3. Kojun Hamada & Takao Ohkawa & Makoto Okamura, 2022. "Optimal taxation in a free‐entry Cournot oligopoly: The average cost function approach," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(2), pages 1166-1192, May.
    4. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2002:i:3:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Marko Primorac & Silvija Vlah Jeric, 2017. "The Structure of Cigarette Excises in the EU: From Myths to Reality," CESifo Working Paper Series 6386, CESifo.
    6. Ellalee, Haider & Alali, Walid Y., 2022. "A Welfare and Pass-Through Effects of Regulations within Imperfect Competition," MPRA Paper 116512, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Susanne Dröge & Philipp J. H. Schröder, 2005. "Corrective Ad Valorem and Unit Taxes: A Welfare Comparison," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 534, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    8. François Boldron & Cyril Hariton, 2003. "Access charge and imperfect competition," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 69(3), pages 319-340.
    9. Carbonnier, Clément, 2014. "The incidence of non-linear price-dependent consumption taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 111-119.
    10. Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines Jr., 2001. "Perfect Taxation with Imperfect Competition," NBER Working Papers 8138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Gagnie Pascal Yebarth, 2025. "On Taxation Policy in Strategic Bilateral Exchange: A review," EconomiX Working Papers 2025-34, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    12. Adachi, Takanori & Fabinger, Michal, 2022. "Pass-through, welfare, and incidence under imperfect competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    13. Wang, Vey & Lai, Chung-Hui, 2010. "Franchise Fee, Tax/Subsidy Policies and Economic Growth," MPRA Paper 27745, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Liqun Liu & Thomas R. Saving, 2005. "Market Substitution and the Pareto Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxation," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(2), pages 463-481, October.
    15. Hiroshi Aiura & Hikaru Ogawa, 2019. "Indirect taxes in a cross-border shopping model: a monopolistic competition approach," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(2), pages 147-175, October.
    16. Giuseppe Colangelo & Umberto Galmarini, 2001. "Ad Valorem Taxation on Intermediate Goods in Oligopoly," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(1), pages 53-73, January.
    17. Hamilton, Stephen F., 1999. "Tax incidence under oligopoly: a comparison of policy approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-245, February.
    18. Etro, Federico, 2016. "Research in economics and public finance," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-6.
    19. Anna D'Annunzio & Mohammed Mardan & Antonio Russo, 2020. "Multi‐part tariffs and differentiated commodity taxation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 786-804, September.
    20. Vincenzo Denicolo & Massimo Matteuzzi, 2000. "Specific and Ad Valorem Taxation in Asymmetric Cournot Oligopolies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 7(3), pages 335-342, May.
    21. Martin Peitz & Markus Reisinger, 2014. "Indirect Taxation in Vertical Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 709-755, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2003_num_17_3_1468. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Equipe PERSEE (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.