Tradition and Common Property Management
Since management of a common property resource can be undertaken only by a government of finitely lived agents, studying the behavior of such governments is a natural way to study common property management. The author proposes that we regard the choice of management objective by such a government as a 'move' in a game of sequential agents. Given this framework, it is shown that subgame perfect equilibria exist in which successive governments choose the same 'traditional' management objective. These strategies enable an economy to overcome any intergenerational externality. Thus, following a tradition of conservation may be a rational response to an intergenerational externality.
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Volume (Year): 32 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
- Jacques Cremer, 1986. "Cooperation in Ongoing Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 101(1), pages 33-49.
- Matthew A. Turner, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Common Property Regulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 809-821, November.
- Olson, Lars J. & Knapp, Keith C., 1997. "Exhaustible Resource Allocation in an Overlapping Generations Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 277-292, March.
- Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-677, September.
- Solow, Robert, 1993. "An almost practical step toward sustainability," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 162-172, September.
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