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Wie sinnvoll ist der klimapolitische Alleingang Deutschlands?

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  • Joachim Weimann

Abstract

Um klimapolitische Maßnahmen hinsichtlich ihrer Wirkung abschätzen und bewerten zu können, ist es hilfreich, sich die wichtigsten Charakteristika des Klimaproblems noch einmal ins Gedächtnis zu rufen. Klimapolitik zu betreiben bedeutet, ein global öffentliches Gut zur Verfügung zu stellen. Die klassischen Eigenschaften eines öffentlichen Gutes sind erfüllt: Niemand kann vom Konsum des stabilen Klimas ausgeschlossen werden, und es besteht keinerlei Rivalität im Konsum. Daher ist jedes Land in der Lage, die Freifahrerposition einzunehmen: Es kann die Vorteile eines stabilen Klimasystems nutzen, auch wenn es selbst keinen Beitrag zum Klimaschutz geleistet hat. Verschärft wird dieses Problem dadurch, dass die Möglichkeit eines kollektiven Beschlusses im internationalen Kontext ausgeschlossen ist, da keine supranationale Institution existiert, die in der Lage wäre, eine kollektive Entscheidung durchzusetzen. Diese Charakterisierung des Klimaproblems ist bekannt und unumstritten. Sie wird hier vorangestellt, weil die Beurteilung eines klimapolitischen Alleingangs unbedingt auf diese Besonderheiten des Klimaproblems Bezug nehmen muss. Im Folgenden wird zunächst die Frage gestellt, welche direkten ökologischen und ökonomischen Effekte ein Alleingang haben kann. Es wird sich dabei schnell zeigen, dass diese nicht in der Lage sind, einen solchen Alleingang zu begründen. Im Gegenteil, die unmittelbaren Effekte für das Land, das den Alleingang unternimmt, dürften negativ sein. Das Beispiel Deutschlands, um das es im Weiteren gehen wird, ist insofern ein besonderes, als zu der Entscheidung, Klimapolitik im Alleingang zu betreiben, im Kontext der sogenannten Energiewende der Ausstieg aus der Atomenergie hinzukommt.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Weimann, 2012. "Wie sinnvoll ist der klimapolitische Alleingang Deutschlands?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 65(12), pages 36-39, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:65:y:2012:i:12:p:36-39
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