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Do we need a quota system for women?

Author

Listed:
  • Barbara Steffens
  • Gregor Thüsing
  • Christine Bortenlänger
  • Jana Oehmichen
  • Marie-Christine Ostermann
  • Günter Buchholz

Abstract

The Federal Justice Department and the Federal Family Ministry want to submit a legislative proposal that would compel companies to determine and publish the proportion of women to be employed at the management level. According to Barbara Steffens, Minister for Health, Emancipation, Care and the Aged of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, there exist considerable deficits regarding equal opportunity for women. Not only are expensive investments in education being wasted, but valuable creative potential is lost for business. That is why the State Government of North Rhine-Westphalia will argue for a quota system for boards of supervisors in listed companies. In addition, measures are to be introduced in North Rhine-Westphalia to achieve gender parity on supervisory and administrative boards in state-owned and community businesses and organizations. According to Gregor Thüsing, University of Bonn, legislative measures to achieve equal gender opportunity in management positions are meaningful. But, he says, the quota system is always unjust to the members of the other gender who will be disadvantaged given equal qualifications. Christine Bortenlänger, Bayerische Börse AG, is 100 percent in favour of a quota system. According to her, at present the quota system is the fastest way to achieve change in Germany and to catch up to other countries where frequently the share of women in leading positions is much higher than the German average. She finds this situation alarming given that companies with mixed management do better and also are more innovative. Jana Oehmichen, University of Karlsruhe, sees three risks connected with the introduction of a quota system: the general suspicion attached to a "quota woman", the delegation of important decisions to other bodies, and the lack of potential candidates. Marie-Christine Ostermann, Association DIE JUNGEN UNTERNEHMER, holds the opinion that there is no need for a quota system: "You don't do women in our country a favour by creating "quota women" by law. This would be counterproductive for equal-rights cooperation in businesses. In filling a position, the qualification alone should be decisive - and not the gender." And Günter Buchholz, Hannover Polytechnic, also sees no need, as in his opinion equal opportunity between men and women has all but been reached.

Suggested Citation

  • Barbara Steffens & Gregor Thüsing & Christine Bortenlänger & Jana Oehmichen & Marie-Christine Ostermann & Günter Buchholz, 2010. "Do we need a quota system for women?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(17), pages 03-15, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:63:y:2010:i:17:p:03-15
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, April.
    2. Katja Rost & Margit Osterloh, 2008. "You Pay a Fee for Strong Beliefs: Homogeneity as a Driver of Corporate Governance Failure," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-28, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations
    • J70 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - General
    • L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General
    • M50 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - General

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