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Auswirkungen einer Länderfusion auf die öffentlichen Finanzen am Beispiel von Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg

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  • Thiess Büttner
  • Sebastian Hauptmeier

Abstract

In diesem Beitrag werden einige finanzwissenschaftliche Anmerkungen zu den Vorteilen einer Länderfusion von Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein getroffen und in den Kontext der bestehenden Finanzverfassung gestellt. Eine Länderfusion von Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein verspricht unter anderem Kostenersparnisse, die nach vorliegenden empirischen Untersuchungen bei grob 4% des Budgets (auf Landesebene) anzusetzen sind. Auch im Hinblick auf den Föderalismus wäre ein Zusammengehen vorteilhaft. Jedoch bestraft die föderale Finanzverfassung den Zusammenschluss. Nach den Ergebnissen der Analyse ist mit einem jährlichen Minderbetrag an Einnahmen von insgesamt 1 063,1 Mill. € bzw. 7,5% des Budgets zu rechnen. Um eine Fusion nicht zu gefährden, ist eine Kompensation für höhere Abflüsse in den Finanzausgleich denkbar, in dem Sinne, dass die anderen Bundesländer auf Vorteile in den Transfers zugunsten des fusionierten Bundeslandes verzichten.

Suggested Citation

  • Thiess Büttner & Sebastian Hauptmeier, 2006. "Auswirkungen einer Länderfusion auf die öffentlichen Finanzen am Beispiel von Schleswig-Holstein und Hamburg," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 59(10), pages 17-22, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ifosdt:v:59:y:2006:i:10:p:17-22
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Homburg, Stefan, 1997. "Ursachen und Wirkungen eines zwischenstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs," EconStor Open Access Articles, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 61-95.
    2. Frey, Bruno S. & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 315-327, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Büttner & Petra Enß & Fédéric Holm-Hadulla & Robert Schwager & Christiane Starbatty & Wiebke Webering, 2010. "Der kommunale Finanzausgleich in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern : langfristige Entwicklung und Reformperspektiven ; Teil I: Der vertikale Finanzausgleich ; Gutachten im Auftrag des Innenministeriums des Lande," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 45, October.
    2. Blesse, Sebastian & Heinemann, Friedrich, 2020. "Citizens’ trade-offs in state merger decisions: Evidence from a randomized survey experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 438-471.
    3. Jonathan Old & Felix Rösel, 2018. "Sparprojekt oder Milchmädchenrechnung? Die finanziellen Effekte eines Bundeslandes„Mitteldeutschland“," ifo Dresden berichtet, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 25(02), pages 12-17, April.
    4. Kellermann, Kersten, 2007. "Kosten der Kleinheit und die Föderalismusdebatte in der Schweiz," KOFL Working Papers 3, Konjunkturforschungsstelle Liechtenstein (KOFL), Vaduz.
    5. Kersten Kellermann, 2008. "„Kosten der Kleinheit” und die Föderalismusdebatte in der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(2), pages 196-225, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Öffentliche Finanzwirtschaft; Fusion; Föderalismus; Finanzausgleich; Hamburg; Schleswig-Holstein; Deutschland;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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