IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cem/jaecon/v4y2001n2p217-254.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Institutions, Contracts And Regulation Of Infrastructure In Argentina

Author

Listed:
  • Manuel A. Abdala

    (LECG, LLC.)

Abstract

Massive privatization in the Argentine infrastructure and public service sectors gave an opportunity to explore why we observe notorious differences in regulatory design choices and performance outcomes across sectors, under the umbrella of similar nation-specific institutional characteristics -same federal government producing reform during a short period of time (1990-95)-. Following the Levy and Spiller (1996) conceptual framework, we propose that some institutional characteristics (namely the nature of conflicts among groups affected by reform and administrative capabilities) determined a wide variety of government choices for regulatory incentives, producing different outcomes across sectors. Despite the will of the executive power to respect stable "rules of the game", episodes of government opportunism appeared in most sectors. Poor regulatory incentive design and weak agencies, on the other hand, prompted ex-post opportunistic behavior from regulated firms, which renegotiated contractual conditions to their favor.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel A. Abdala, 2001. "Institutions, Contracts And Regulation Of Infrastructure In Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 4, pages 217-254, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:4:y:2001:n:2:p:217-254
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume4/abdala.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
    2. Santiago Urbiztondo & Fernando Navajas & Daniel Artana, 1998. "La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones," Research Department Publications 3038, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2007. "Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6163-6187, December.
    2. Jamasb, T. & Mota, R. & Newbery, D. & Pollitt, M., 2004. "‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0439, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Jamasb, Tooraj, 2006. "Between the state and market: Electricity sector reform in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 14-30, March.
    4. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Electricity reform in Argentina: Lessons for developing countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1536-1567, July.
    5. Marques, Rui Cunha, 2017. "Why not regulate PPPs?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 141-146.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
    2. Montoya, Miguel A. & Trillas, Francesc, 2007. "The measurement of the independence of telecommunications regulatory agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 182-190, September.
    3. Catherine Locatelli & Sylvain Rossiaud, 2011. "A neoinstitutionalist interpretation of the changes in the Russian oil model," Post-Print halshs-00631115, HAL.
    4. Erkan Erdogdu, 2014. "The Political Economy of Electricity Market Liberalization: A Cross-country Approach," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    5. Denis Phan & Lise Rochaix-Ranson, 2000. "Présentation générale," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 145(4), pages 97-105.
    6. Ratnakar Adhikari & Malathy Knight-John, 2004. "What Type of Competition Policy and Law Should a Developing Country Have? 1," South Asia Economic Journal, Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, vol. 5(1), pages 1-25, March.
    7. didier chabaud & Parthenay Claude & Yannick Perez, 2005. "Environnement institutionnel et trajectoire des entreprises : une analyse northienne de l’industrie électrique," Post-Print hal-04297605, HAL.
    8. Andrew Powell, 1996. "Sobre la reestructuración, regulación y competencia en el sector de servicios públicos: experiencia del Reino Unido y sus implicaciones para América Latina," Research Department Publications 4039, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    9. Tamer Četin & Feridun Yilmaz, 2010. "Transition to the Regulatory State in Turkey: Lessons from Energy," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(2), pages 393-402.
    10. Li, Yan, 2011. "The competitive landscape of China’s telecommunications industry: Is there a need for further regulatory reform?," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 125-133.
    11. Kirkpatrick, Colin & Parker, David, 2004. "Regulation and the Privatisation of Water Services in Developing Countries: Assessing the Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30600, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    12. Ba, Lika & Gasmi, Farid, 2011. "To what extent do infrastructure and financial sectors reforms interplay? Evidence from panel data on the power sector in developing countries," IDEI Working Papers 692, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    13. Spiller, Pablo T., 2013. "Transaction cost regulation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 232-242.
    14. Zarco-Jasso, Hugo, 2005. "Public-private partnerships: A multidimensional model for contracting," IESE Research Papers D/584, IESE Business School.
    15. Tomaso Duso & Lars-Hendrik Röller, 2001. "Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation," CIG Working Papers FS IV 01-17, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    16. Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Research Department Publications 4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    17. Nepal, Rabindra & Jamasb, Tooraj, 2012. "Reforming the power sector in transition: Do institutions matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 1675-1682.
    18. Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley, 2010. "The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institutional Economics," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654327, HAL.
    19. Emmanuelle Auriol & Antonio Estache & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2018. "Can Supranational Infrastructure Regulation Compensate for National Institutional Weaknesses?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 69(6), pages 913-936.
    20. Wallsten, Scott, 2002. "Does sequencing matter? regulation and privatization in telecommunications reforms," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2817, The World Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; institutional economics; post-privatization; infrastructure; utilities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:4:y:2001:n:2:p:217-254. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Valeria Dowding (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cemaaar.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.