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Institutions, Contracts And Regulation Of Infrastructure In Argentina

Author

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  • Manuel A. Abdala

    () (LECG, LLC.)

Abstract

Massive privatization in the Argentine infrastructure and public service sectors gave an opportunity to explore why we observe notorious differences in regulatory design choices and performance outcomes across sectors, under the umbrella of similar nation-specific institutional characteristics -same federal government producing reform during a short period of time (1990-95)-. Following the Levy and Spiller (1996) conceptual framework, we propose that some institutional characteristics (namely the nature of conflicts among groups affected by reform and administrative capabilities) determined a wide variety of government choices for regulatory incentives, producing different outcomes across sectors. Despite the will of the executive power to respect stable "rules of the game", episodes of government opportunism appeared in most sectors. Poor regulatory incentive design and weak agencies, on the other hand, prompted ex-post opportunistic behavior from regulated firms, which renegotiated contractual conditions to their favor.

Suggested Citation

  • Manuel A. Abdala, 2001. "Institutions, Contracts And Regulation Of Infrastructure In Argentina," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 4, pages 217-254, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:4:y:2001:n:2:p:217-254
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    File URL: http://www.cema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume4/abdala.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Santiago Urbiztondo & Fernando Navajas & Daniel Artana, 1998. "La autonomía de los entes reguladores argentinos: Agua y cloacas, gas natural, energía eléctrica y telecomunicaciones," Research Department Publications 3038, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Spiller, Pablo T, 1996. "Institutions and Commitment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 421-452.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jamasb, Tooraj, 2006. "Between the state and market: Electricity sector reform in developing countries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 14-30, March.
    2. Jamasb, Tooraj & Pollitt, Michael, 2007. "Incentive regulation of electricity distribution networks: Lessons of experience from Britain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 6163-6187, December.
    3. repec:eee:juipol:v:48:y:2017:i:c:p:141-146 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Jamasb, T. & Mota, R. & Newbery, D. & Pollitt, M., 2004. "‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0439, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    5. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "Electricity reform in Argentina: Lessons for developing countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1536-1567, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    regulation; institutional economics; post-privatization; infrastructure; utilities;

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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