Unearthing The Purports Of Trust In Authorities And Power Of Authorities In The Latin American Tax Climate

In tax behavior research field, two dimensions compiling the “slippery slope framework ” are regarded as main drivers of compliance, i.e., perceived trust in authorities and perceived power of authorities. The former grasps citizens’ cognitions towards the efforts tax authorities render in benevolently supplying public goods. The latter covers general cognitions about authorities’ capacity of detecting and efficiently inflicting punishments on tax dodgers. Following interactions which involve both parties of the tax game, a society’s common good is secured through the ensued tax compliance level. Nevertheless, like any outcome depending on cooperation, compliance is frail . This happens mainly because authorities are called to mediate an ongoing clash between citizens who abide by legal prescriptions, through voluntary or enforced compliance, and citizens who eschew them if opportunities arise, through avoidance or evasion. Depending on the chosen mediation approach (trust-based or power-based), one type of compliance prevails over another. The present writing explores new insights of the framework ’s chief dimensions within the perimeter of the Latin American interaction tax climate (viz. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru) by dint of economic, fiscal and psychological determinants. The proposed methodological apparatus ranges from operationalizing World Bank governance indicators (government effectiveness, rule of law, regulatory quality, control for corruption) as trust and power proxies, assessing economic growth through chain base indexes and rating ease of tax compliance based on reliable benchmarks (e.g., Paying Taxes indicators, shadow economy, corruption perceptions). The leading goal of the study is to make authorities, investors, international organizations and laypeople cognizant of the role trust in and power of authorities play for compliance levels reached in the Latin American tax climate. Grounding decision-making on comprehensive valuations of trust and power may prove cost -effective for any authority concerned with enacting the appropriate weighting of tax incentives and enforcement strategies in order to enhance compliance; it may urge taxpayers to match the actions of an equitable authority and cooperate; it may serve investors as a guide to determine the efficiency, credibility and stability of Latin American fiscal systems; it may assist financing international organizations to detect the possible risks and vulnerabilities of the relationship between authorities and taxpayers and evaluate the headway/regress registered by a particular country within this tax climate. In terms of trust, various countries in the region have implemented solid strategies to sustain competitiveness, infrastructure, innovation or health. In terms of power, several tax authorities are deemed as rather weak in mitigating noncompliance. Nevertheless, massive investments in infrastructure prove commitment in nixing evasion.