Learning and governance in inter-firm relations
This article connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. Two kinds of relational risk are identified: hold-up and spillover risk. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, the article presents a set of instruments that includes trust, next to instruments adopted and adapted from TCE. It also includes roles for go-betweens. Some references to empirical evidence are included.
Volume (Year): 114 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wuyts, S.H.K. & Colombo, M. & Dutta, S. & Nooteboom, B., 2005.
"Empirical Tests of Optimal Cognitive Distance,"
2005-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Wuyts, S.H.K. & Colombo, M.G. & Dutta, S. & Nooteboom, B., 2004. "Empirical Tests Of Optimal Cognitive Distance," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2004-007-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1993. "Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 453-86, April.
- Klos, Tomas B. & Nooteboom, Bart, 2001. "Agent-based computational transaction cost economics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 503-526, March.
- Siegwart Lindenberg, 2000. "It Takes Both Trust and Lack of Mistrust: The Workings of Cooperation and Relational Signaling in Contractual Relationships," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 11-33, March.
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