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Corporate governance, ownership concentration and performance of European agricultural companies: New empirical evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Graţiela Georgiana Noja

    (Department of Marketing and International Economic Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, West University of Timişoara, Timişoara, Romania)

  • Mirela Cristea

    (Department of Finance, Banking and Economic Analysis, Center for Economic, Banking and Financial Research (CEBAFI), Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania)

  • Nicoleta Sîrghi

    (Department of Economics and Economic Modelling, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, West University of Timişoara, Timişoara, Romania)

  • Oana-Ramona Socoliuc Guriță

    (Department of Economics and International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași, Iași, Romania)

  • Ioana Vădăsan

    (Department of Economics and Economic Modelling, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, West University of Timişoara, Timişoara, Romania)

  • Daniel Cîrciumaru

    (Department of Finance, Banking and Economic Analysis, Center for Economic, Banking and Financial Research (CEBAFI), Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Craiova, Craiova, Romania)

Abstract

Considering the relevance of the agricultural sectors for the European countries' development, but also the volatile features of agriculture, with unforeseen risks induced by climate, ensuring durable economic progress is foremost for the companies. This paper aims to assess the associations of the key parties in corporate governance (directors, managers, advisers, and shareholders), employees and the independence level with the main outcomes and capacity/size of the European companies operating in agriculture, fishing, and aquaculture activities. Using a newly compiled and complex dataset of 3 184 active companies from Europe, provided by the ORBIS database, advanced modelling approaches were employed, based on the robust regression (RREG) and Gaussian Graphical Model (GGM). The main findings emphasised that: directors, managers, and advisors had a strong positive influence on the firms' size, boosting their turnover, and the shareholders' funds; advisors induced positive connections with the companies' liquidity; the number of employees exerted positive impacts on the firms' size and outcomes of these companies; the independence level exerted a negative impact on the firms' size and outcomes. Finally, specific measures must be addressed to primarily reconsider the number of directors and managers and the shareholders' participation in the ownership of these companies due to their unfavourable exerted effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Graţiela Georgiana Noja & Mirela Cristea & Nicoleta Sîrghi & Oana-Ramona Socoliuc Guriță & Ioana Vădăsan & Daniel Cîrciumaru, 2023. "Corporate governance, ownership concentration and performance of European agricultural companies: New empirical evidence," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 69(4), pages 151-161.
  • Handle: RePEc:caa:jnlage:v:69:y:2023:i:4:id:78-2023-agricecon
    DOI: 10.17221/78/2023-AGRICECON
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    References listed on IDEAS

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