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Is Google the Next Microsoft: Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Online Search

Author

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  • Pollock Rufus

    (University of Cambridge)

Abstract

The rapid growth of online search and its centrality to the ecology of the Internet pose important questions: why is the search engine market so concentrated, and will it evolve towards monopoly? What implications does this concentration have for consumers, search engines, and advertisers? Does search require regulation, and, if so, in what form? This paper supplies empirical and theoretical material with which to examine these questions. In particular, we (a) show that the already large levels of concentration are likely to continue; (b) identify the consequences, negative and positive, of this outcome; and (c) discuss the regulatory interventions that policy-makers could use to address these.

Suggested Citation

  • Pollock Rufus, 2010. "Is Google the Next Microsoft: Competition, Welfare and Regulation in Online Search," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(4), pages 1-31, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:9:y:2010:i:4:n:4
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dolata, Ulrich, 2014. "Märkte und Macht der Internetkonzerne: Konzentration - Konkurrenz - Innovationsstrategien," Research Contributions to Organizational Sociology and Innovation Studies, SOI Discussion Papers 2014-04, University of Stuttgart, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Organizational Sociology and Innovation Studies.
    2. Dolata, Ulrich, 2017. "Apple, Amazon, Google, Facebook, Microsoft: Market concentration - competition - innovation strategies," Research Contributions to Organizational Sociology and Innovation Studies, SOI Discussion Papers 2017-01, University of Stuttgart, Institute for Social Sciences, Department of Organizational Sociology and Innovation Studies.
    3. Cédric Argenton & Jens Prüfer, 2012. "Search Engine Competition With Network Externalities," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 73-105.
    4. Justus Haucap & Ulrich Heimeshoff, 2014. "Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet driving competition or market monopolization?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 49-61, February.
    5. Jean-Pascal Bassino & Aurélien Faravelon & Stéphane Grumbach, 2015. "Cross-Border Data Exchanges : The Rise of Platform Economy in Asia," Post-Print hal-01245080, HAL.
    6. Engelhardt Sebastian von & Freytag Andreas & Köllmann Volker, 2013. "Wettbewerbspolitischer Handlungsbedarf bei der Verknüpfung von zweiseitigen Märkten im Internet: Der Fall Google," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 62(3), pages 311-332, December.
    7. White, Alexander, 2013. "Search engines: Left side quality versus right side profits," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 690-701.
    8. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2013. "MicroHoo: Deal failure, industry rivalry, and sources of overbidding," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(C), pages 20-35.
    9. Haucap, Justus, 2015. "Ordnungspolitik und Kartellrecht im Zeitalter der Digitalisierung," DICE Ordnungspolitische Perspektiven 77, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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