IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rlecon/v4y2008i1n11.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages

Author

Listed:
  • Cooper David

    (20/20 Business Vision)

  • Tomlin Jonathan T

    (LECG)

Abstract

The Supreme Courts decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals placed federal judges in the role of gatekeepers empowered to screen out unreliable expert testimony. We address the impact of gatekeeping on the accuracy of expert testimony and, consequently, on the accuracy of jury decision-making through a simple game-theoretic model. We find that a sufficiently high probability of excluding biased testimony is essential for accurate damages awards. Otherwise, asymmetries in the judicial process lead to damages awards that are either insufficient or excessive relative to true damages. We explain the conditions leading to each outcome and demonstrate that excessive damages awards are more likely to occur in complex cases. We also discuss the role of a court-appointed technical advisor and briefly explain how the threat alone that a judge will use such an advisor can deter biased testimony and lead to an accurate expected damages award.

Suggested Citation

  • Cooper David & Tomlin Jonathan T, 2008. "Expert Testimony, Daubert, and the Determination of Damages," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 213-231, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:1:n:11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle.2008.4.1/rle.2008.4.1.1184/rle.2008.4.1.1184.xml?format=INT
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Froeb, Luke M. & Kobayashi, Bruce H., 2001. "Evidence production in adversarial vs. inquisitorial regimes," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 267-272, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," EconomiX Working Papers 2016-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    2. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers 2016-13, CRESE.
    3. Wenli Li & Ishani Tewari & Michelle White, 2014. "Using Bankruptcy to Reduce Foreclosures," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 12(3), pages 31-38, October.
    4. Yves Oytana & Nathalie Chappe, 2016. "Expert opinion in a tort litigation game," Working Papers hal-01413908, HAL.
    5. repec:ces:ifodic:v:12:y:2014:i:3:p:19126471 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:4:y:2008:i:1:n:11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Peter Golla). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.