IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/pepspp/v25y2019i4p7n8.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Israel’s Foreign Aid to Africa & UN Voting: An Empirical Examination

Author

Listed:
  • Lutmar Carmela

    (School of Political Sciences, Division of International Relations, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel)

  • Mandler Leah

    (School of Political Sciences, Division of International Relations, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel)

Abstract

According to International Relations scholarship, the main formal motivation for foreign aid is usually the unexpressed expectation for improvement of bilateral relations and overall international support. There is an anticipation that aid recipients will not “forget” their donors on the international stage, in particularly during important sessions at the UNGA. We test this assertion empirically on the case of Israeli foreign aid to African countries, using data on Israeli Official Development Aid provisions between 1997 and 2014, and data on voting patterns of aid recipients in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). Our results testify that Israeli bilateral humanitarian foreign aid not only has not provided its expected diplomatic revenues, but may perhaps even hindered African states’ support in the UN. Concomitantly, our results testify that Israeli Official Development Aid (ODA) does not have the anticipated long term effects on international support towards Israel, but instead only a short-lived influence. The results are informative about the usefulness of foreign aid as a diplomatic tool, with important policy implications for decision makers in Israel and worldwide.

Suggested Citation

  • Lutmar Carmela & Mandler Leah, 2019. "Israel’s Foreign Aid to Africa & UN Voting: An Empirical Examination," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 25(4), pages 1-7, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:25:y:2019:i:4:p:7:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2019-0035
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2019-0035
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/peps-2019-0035?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Axel Dreher & Peter Nunnenkamp & Rainer Thiele, 2008. "Does US aid buy UN general assembly votes? A disaggregated analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 139-164, July.
    2. Fink, Günther & Redaelli, Silvia, 2011. "Determinants of International Emergency Aid--Humanitarian Need Only?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 741-757, May.
    3. Alesina, Alberto & Dollar, David, 2000. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 33-63, March.
    4. Alberto Alesina & Beatrice Weder, 2002. "Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1126-1137, September.
    5. Anke Hoeffler & Verity Outram, 2011. "Need, Merit, or Self‐Interest—What Determines the Allocation of Aid?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 237-250, May.
    6. de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno & Smith, Alastair, 2009. "A Political Economy of Aid," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(2), pages 309-340, April.
    7. Carter, David B. & Stone, Randall W., 2015. "Democracy and Multilateralism: The Case of Vote Buying in the UN General Assembly," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(1), pages 1-33, January.
    8. Ilyana Kuziemko & Eric Werker, 2006. "How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(5), pages 905-930, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Acht, Martin & Omar Mahmoud, Toman & Thiele, Rainer, 2014. "Corrupt governments receive less bilateral aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-government actors," Kiel Working Papers 1901, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    2. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin & Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2024. "Aid effectiveness and donor motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    3. Acht, Martin & Mahmoud, Toman Omar & Thiele, Rainer, 2015. "Corrupt governments do not receive more state-to-state aid: Governance and the delivery of foreign aid through non-state actors," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 20-33.
    4. Angelika J. Budjan & Andreas Fuchs, 2021. "Democracy and Aid Donorship," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(4), pages 217-238, November.
    5. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2019. "Friends for the benefits: The effects of political ties on sovereign borrowing conditions," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 13/2019, Bank of Finland.
    6. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2019. "Friends for the benefits: The effects of political ties on sovereign borrowing conditions," Research Discussion Papers 13/2019, Bank of Finland.
    7. Stubbs, Thomas H. & Kentikelenis, Alexander E. & King, Lawrence P., 2016. "Catalyzing Aid? The IMF and Donor Behavior in Aid Allocation," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 511-528.
    8. Ambrocio, Gene & Hasan, Iftekhar, 2021. "Quid pro quo? Political ties and sovereign borrowing," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    9. Baydag, Rena Melis & Klingebiel, Stephan & Marschall, Paul, 2018. "Shaping the patterns of aid allocation: a comparative analysis of seven bilateral donors and the European Union," IDOS Discussion Papers 22/2018, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    10. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2019_013 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    12. Raschky, Paul A. & Schwindt, Manijeh, 2012. "On the channel and type of aid: The case of international disaster assistance," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 119-131.
    13. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M., 2013. "Country or leader? Political change and UN General Assembly voting," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 183-196.
    14. Lanati, Mauro & Thiele, Rainer, 2018. "The impact of foreign aid on migration revisited," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 59-74.
    15. Mohamed Mounir Sraieb, 2015. "An Empirical Model for U.S. Foreign Aid Allocation," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2015-48, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    16. Gerda Asmus-Bluhm & Vera Z. Eichenauer & Andreas Fuchs & Bradley Parks, 2025. "Does India Use Development Finance to Compete With China? A Subnational Analysis," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 69(2-3), pages 406-433, March.
    17. Wonjae Hwang & Jeeseon Hwang, 2023. "Health aid for states with dissimilar foreign policy preferences, a tool for peace?," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 26(1), pages 55-70, March.
    18. Elena V. McLean, 2017. "The politics of contract allocation in the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 255-279, June.
    19. Hicks, Daniel L. & Hicks, Joan Hamory & Maldonado, Beatriz, 2016. "Women as policy makers and donors: Female legislators and foreign aid," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 46-60.
    20. Minasyan, Anna, 2018. "US aid, US educated leaders and economic ideology," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 244-257.
    21. Christian Bommer & Axel Dreher & Marcello Perez-Alvarez, 2018. "Regional and Ethnic Favoritism in the Allocation of Humanitarian Aid," CESifo Working Paper Series 7038, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:25:y:2019:i:4:p:7:n:8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyterbrill.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.