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Fragwürdige Luxussteuern: Statusstreben und demonstratives Konsumverhalten in der Geschichte ökonomischen Denkens / Questionable Luxury Taxes: Status Seeking and Conspicuous Consumption in the History of Economic Thought

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  • Thomas Tobias

Abstract

In the history of economic thought luxury, status seeking and conspicuous consumption are seen highly divergent. Thus, it is hardly surprising that economic advice with respect to a possible governmental intervention varies with time and perspective. This contribution provides an overview how conspicuous consumption was seen in the history of economic thought and outlines the connection between recent contributions and historical thinking on the issue. On the one hand, recent policy recommendations are often based on the arbitrary definition of status seeking as a zero sum game and partly on an incorrect welfare comparison. On the other hand, specific characteristics of the market demand function for status goods make the taxation of luxuries a venture with incalculable outcomes. Taking these results into account luxury taxes are hard to justify and extremely difficult to design.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Tobias, 2008. "Fragwürdige Luxussteuern: Statusstreben und demonstratives Konsumverhalten in der Geschichte ökonomischen Denkens / Questionable Luxury Taxes: Status Seeking and Conspicuous Consumption in the History," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 59(1), pages 91-114, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:59:y:2008:i:1:p:91-114:n:8
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2008-0108
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    References listed on IDEAS

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