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Land Deals in Africa: Pioneers and Speculators

  • Collier Paul

    (University of Oxford)

  • Venables Anthony J.

    (University of Oxford)

Much African land currently has low productivity and has attracted investors leasing land as a speculative option on higher future prices or productivity. To be beneficial land deals need to induce productivity enhancing investments. Some of these will be publicly provided (infrastructure, agronomic knowledge), and some can only be provided by ‘pioneer’ investors who discover what works and create demonstration effects. Such pioneers can be rewarded for the positive externalities they create by being granted options on large areas of land. However, pioneers must be separated from speculators by screening and by requirements to work a fraction of the land.

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Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Journal of Globalization and Development.

Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 1-22

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Handle: RePEc:bpj:globdv:v:3:y:2012:i:1:n:3
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  1. Grenadier, Steven R., 1995. "Valuing lease contracts A real-options approach," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 297-331, July.
  2. Avinash Dixit, 1992. "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 107-132, Winter.
  3. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October.
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