Market Research and Market Design
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References listed on IDEAS
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Robust Mechanism Design,"
Econometric Society, vol. 73(6), pages 1771-1813, November.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000035, UCLA Department of Economics.
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- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
- Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2003. "Robust Mechanism Design," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1421R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Apr 2004.
- Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2008. "Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses," Discussion Papers 1472, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Devanur, Nikhil R. & Hartline, Jason D. & Yan, Qiqi, 2015. "Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 103-143.
- Goldberg, Andrew V. & Hartline, Jason D. & Karlin, Anna R. & Saks, Michael & Wright, Andrew, 2006. "Competitive auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 242-269, May.
- Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio, 2015. "Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 77-102.
- Pierangelo Mori, 2008. "Design of Multidimensional Franchise Auctions by an Ignorant Principal," Working Papers - Economics wp2008_13.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2007.
"When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries?,"
dp0706, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
- Simon Loertscher & Andras Niedermayer, 2007. "When is Seller Price Setting with Linear Fees Optimal for Intermediaries?," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1014, The University of Melbourne.
- Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
- Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong & Roughgarden, Tim & Yan, Qiqi, 2015. "Revenue maximization with a single sample," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 318-333.
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