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A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Holzer Jorge

    (Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, 2200 Symons Hall, College Park, MD, 20742, USA)

  • McConnell Kenneth

    (Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Maryland, 2200 Symons Hall, College Park, MD, 20742, USA)

Abstract

Economists have long known that properly designed markets allocate resources efficiently. However, in many circumstances markets are unfeasible. In this paper, we construct a general model of access which allows us to value different assignments when resources are allocated in the absence of markets. We demonstrate that marginal value schedules are far less useful in allocating access when property rights are unattainable. The criteria for optimal allocation combine information on both the marginal value schedules and the assignments determining the probabilities of access to the resource. Our approach allows us to rank rationing policies in a wide range of real-world, second-best settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Holzer Jorge & McConnell Kenneth, 2016. "A Model of Access in the Absence of Markets," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 367-388, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:16:y:2016:i:1:p:367-388:n:13
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2015-0026
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yoon, Kiho, 2011. "Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 670-676.
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    4. Joseph Seneca, 1970. "The welfare effects of zero pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 101-110, March.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    access; allocation; rationing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H44 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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