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No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects

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  • Shunya Noda
  • Genta Okada

Abstract

We study efficient mechanism design for allocating multiple heterogeneous objects. The aim is to maximize the residual surplus, the total value generated from an allocation minus the costs of screening. We discover a robust trend indicating that no-screening mechanisms, such as serial dictatorship with exogenous priority order, tend to perform better as the variety of goods increases. We analyze the underlying reasons by characterizing asymptotically efficient mechanisms in a stylized environment. We also apply an automated mechanism design approach to numerically derive efficient mechanisms and validate the trend in general environments. Building on these implications, we propose the register-invite-book system (RIB) as an efficient system for scheduling vaccinations against pandemic diseases.

Suggested Citation

  • Shunya Noda & Genta Okada, 2024. "No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects," Papers 2408.10077, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2408.10077
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Yoon, Kiho, 2011. "Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(6), pages 670-676.
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    3. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Moulin, Herve, 2001. "A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 295-328, October.
    4. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag A. Pathak & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1954-1978, December.
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