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The Welfare Implications of Rent Control: A Rent-Seeking Contest Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Chang Yang-Ming

    (Kansas State University)

  • Sanders Shane D.

    (Nicholls State University)

Abstract

This paper uses a contest approach to characterize a probabilistic, non-price contest between potential consumers of rent-controlled apartments. The model extends upon the rent control model of Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) as well as the rent-seeking contributions of Hurley (1998), Dixit (1987), and Hirshleifer (1989) to consider the roles of chance and endogenously-chosen efforts in the allocation of rent-controlled apartments. Nash equilibrium effort levels for each consumer-type imply that the effort-inducing cost of rent control is greater than the misallocative cost. Further, misallocative costs are lower under the effort contest interpretation than under random allocation, as high willingness to pay consumers allocates more effort. The relationship between effort contest and misallocation influences the policy's overall social cost.

Suggested Citation

  • Chang Yang-Ming & Sanders Shane D., 2010. "The Welfare Implications of Rent Control: A Rent-Seeking Contest Approach," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-20, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:10:y:2010:i:1:n:95
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.2369
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Shane Sanders & Andrew Luccasen & Abhinav Alakshendra, 2023. "Rent control according to Seinfeld," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 82(2), pages 151-161, March.
    2. Fleck, Robert K., 2014. "Can prohibitions on “price gouging” reduce deadweight losses?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 100-107.
    3. Weisman Dennis L. & Sanders Shane D. & Moundigbaye Mantobaye, 2012. "An Instructional Exercise in Price Controls: Product Quality, Misallocation, and Public Policy," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-21, December.

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