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Perspectives About The Anticipation Of Consumer Behavior- The Key Element In Selling Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • STROE Andreea Mihaela

    (Nicolae Titulescu University)

  • JIROVEANU Daniel Constantin

    (The Bucharest University of Economic Studies)

Abstract

Insurances represent a special product by their nature, thing that implies the management of risks and protective measures in which concerns them. Consumers of this kind of products are individuals that are risk averse, their main concern being to protect their assets or stock echange.In this case, selling this type of products depends on knowing the consumer behavior and adapting continuously the products to the consumer needs. Selling insurance products means effectively to offer a financial support in the future for which the buyer pays continuously. Moreover, it is possible not to benefit from it if the risk does not occurs. Sales management of insurance products represent the managerial component which creates the link between the sold product and the client and has a powerful anticipation proclivity of market tendencies and consumer attitudes. The market place for insurance products mainstays the selling process through its continous development due to creation of new products ( diversification of products and also price ), due to the selling people and organization which plan a lot of actions to influence in a positive way insurance market. Nevertheless, in order to obtain efficiency it is required a rigorously sells management which desires to maximize the synergy effect at the organizational level.

Suggested Citation

  • STROE Andreea Mihaela & JIROVEANU Daniel Constantin, 2013. "Perspectives About The Anticipation Of Consumer Behavior- The Key Element In Selling Insurance," Revista Economica, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 65(2), pages 165-185.
    • Handle: RePEc:blg:reveco:v:65:y:2013:i:2:p:165-185
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
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    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles

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