Perspectives About The Anticipation Of Consumer Behavior- The Key Element In Selling Insurance
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- Rubinstein, Ariel & Yaari, Menahem E., 1983. "Repeated insurance contracts and moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 74-97, June.
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More about this item
Keywords
insurance market; selling process; consumer behavior; insurance products; sales management;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
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