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Rigid rules and slippery standards: How the nature of U.S. Supreme Court precedents influences subsequent state court treatments

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Listed:
  • Matthew D. Montgomery
  • Michael P. Fix
  • Justin T. Kingsland

Abstract

Objective This research develops a new theoretical framework that explains how the U.S. Supreme Court's decision between a rigid rule and a flexible standard influences compliance with the decisions of state high courts over time. Methods To assess the effects of doctrinal rules and standards on state court compliance, we apply our theoretical framework to an examination of state court responses to Miller v. California (1973) and Atkins v. Virginia (2002). Results Our findings show that doctrinal characteristics of Supreme Court precedents influence state court treatments. Our central theoretical argument posits that applications and positive treatments of deterministic rules should decrease the likelihood of future positive treatments, whereas applications and positive treatments of indeterministic standards should increase the likelihood of future positive treatment. Our findings provide support for this expectation. Conclusion This research demonstrates the importance of doctrinal characteristics in shaping state court compliance with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Our findings suggest that rigid, deterministic rules, and slippery indeterministic standards influence lower court compliance in unique ways.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew D. Montgomery & Michael P. Fix & Justin T. Kingsland, 2021. "Rigid rules and slippery standards: How the nature of U.S. Supreme Court precedents influences subsequent state court treatments," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2894-2906, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:102:y:2021:i:6:p:2894-2906
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13082
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