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Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions

Author

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  • CANES-WRONE, BRANDICE
  • CLARK, TOM S.
  • KELLY, JASON P.

Abstract

Most U.S. state supreme court justices face elections or reappointment by elected officials, and research suggests that judicial campaigns have come to resemble those for other offices. We develop predictions on how selection systems should affect judicial decisions and test these predictions on an extensive dataset of death penalty decisions by state courts of last resort. Specifically, the data include over 12,000 decisions on over 2000 capital punishment cases decided between 1980 and 2006 in systems with partisan, nonpartisan, or retention elections or with reappointment. As predicted, the findings suggest that judges face the greatest pressure to uphold capital sentences in systems with nonpartisan ballots. Also as predicted, judges respond similarly to public opinion in systems with partisan elections or reappointment. Finally, the results indicate that the plebiscitary influences on judicial behavior emerge only after interest groups began achieving success at targeting justices for their decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Canes-Wrone, Brandice & Clark, Tom S. & Kelly, Jason P., 2014. "Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(1), pages 23-39, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:108:y:2014:i:01:p:23-39_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Ash, Elliott & MacLeod, W. Bentley, 2021. "Reducing partisanship in judicial elections can improve judge quality: Evidence from U.S. state supreme courts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    2. Matthew D. Montgomery & Michael P. Fix & Justin T. Kingsland, 2021. "Rigid rules and slippery standards: How the nature of U.S. Supreme Court precedents influences subsequent state court treatments," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2894-2906, November.
    3. Adams, Ian T. & McCrain, Joshua & Schiff, Daniel S. & Schiff, Kaylyn Jackson & Mourtgos, Scott M., 2022. "Public Pressure or Peer Influence: What Shapes Police Executives' Views on Civilian Oversight?," SocArXiv mdu96, Center for Open Science.
    4. Bonica, Adam & Sen, Maya, 2017. "The Politics of Selecting the Bench from the Bar: The Legal Profession and Partisan Incentives to Introduce Ideology into Judicial Selection," Working Paper Series rwp17-048, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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