Taxes on Payroll, Revenues and Profits in Three Models of Collective Bargaining
Variations in company taxes are analyzed for a right-to-manage model, an efficient bargaining setting, and a seniority approach. Taxes cannot be shifted forward by the risk-neutral firm. Alternative income and bargaining power are allowed to vary with taxes. Employing the assymetric Nash solution, it is found that changes in a payroll, revenue, or profit tax can have differing implications for labor demand curve models and efficient bargaining solutions. This distinction might provide a novel basis for empirical work. Variations in bargaining power and, within a labor demand curve setting, the union's objective function do not change results. Copyright 1996 by Scottish Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 43 (1996)
Issue (Month): 5 (November)
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