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Which Firms Buy Licenses? Market Positions and License Expenditures

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  • Dirk Czarnitzki
  • Kornelius Kraft

Abstract

This paper presents the empirical results of a comparison of technology licensing expenditures of German companies in order to test implications of the Gilbert and Newbery (1982) model. Aside from standard control variables, the motives for innovation expenditures are also taken into account. We differentiate between firms intending to secure their present position in the market (incumbents) and those intending to enter a new market (challengers). In line with the prediction of the Gilbert and Newbery model, we find that incumbents show higher expenditures for technology licenses than potential entrants. Copyright © The editors of the "Scandinavian Journal of Economics" 2010 .

Suggested Citation

  • Dirk Czarnitzki & Kornelius Kraft, 2010. "Which Firms Buy Licenses? Market Positions and License Expenditures," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(3), pages 471-488, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:112:y:2010:i:3:p:471-488
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    References listed on IDEAS

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