Sachverständige und der Einfluss von Expertise auf Reformen: Eine räumliche Analyse der Föderalismusreform II
This article sheds light on the relationship between politicians and scientific advisors in the second stage of reform of Germany's fiscal federalism. Based on the principal agent theory and a specific model presented by Bueno de Mesquita we derive two hypotheses. Concretely, we expect that policy change depends on both the homogeneity of the experts' signals (H1) and the strength of the experts' signals independently of their preferred policies (H2). For an empirical investigation, we exploit a dataset that includes information about the status quo, the experts' positions and the degree of policy change relating to 416 conflict issues. According to two separate questionnaires in the policy advisory process we differentiate between the fiscal reform in narrower sense and the administrative reform. Our findings show that H1 and H2 have explanatory power for the partly far-reaching fiscal reform, whereas only H1 explains the "fig leaf" of administrative reform. Copyright 2010 die Autoren. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 2010 Verein für Socialpolitik.
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Volume (Year): 11 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (08)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2004. "The art of conversation: eliciting information from experts through multi-stage communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(2), pages 147-179, August.
- Wolfgang Franz, 2000. "Wirtschaftspolitische Beratung: Reminiszenzen und Reflexionen," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 1(1), pages 53-71, 02.
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