Der Emissionshandel in Deutschland und Österreich - ein wirksames Instrument des Klimaschutzes?
Europe has implemented in the year 2005 an emissions trading system in order to fulfill the Kyoto emissions reduction targets. In principle, the instrument should be a cost-efficient measure of climate protection. But within the first implementation phase because of a over-allocation of emissions permits the emissions price declined to almost zero. In order to improve the effectiveness of the emissions trading system, emission permits should be auctioned. In addition, more gases and sectors should ideally be covered. Copyright 2009 die Autoren Journal compilation 2009, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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References listed on IDEAS
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