IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/perwir/v10y2009i1p39-59.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Wer soll für die Schulden im Bundesstaat haften? Eine vernachlässigte Frage der Föderalismusreform II

Author

Listed:
  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Erik R. Fasten

Abstract

Mutual debt liability of the German federal states (Länder) contributed to the large increase of public debt in Germany over the last half century. A commission eager to impose stricter debt limits on state budgets encountered opposition by the Länder. This article proposes the strengthening of the Länder liability for their respective debt in order to disentangle interdependencies between state layers. A recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling is analyzed which sharply reduced bailout expectations of Länder and hence allows for the evolution of new institutions such as public bonds with collective action clauses as intermediate institutions towards strict bankruptcy procedures. Copyright 2009 die Autoren Journal compilation 2009, Verein für Socialpolitik und Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles B. Blankart & Erik R. Fasten, 2009. "Wer soll für die Schulden im Bundesstaat haften? Eine vernachlässigte Frage der Föderalismusreform II," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(1), pages 39-59, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:39-59
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2516.2008.00293.x
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jochimsen, Beate, 2007. "'Staatsschulden ohne Haftung': Eine Option für deutsche Bundesländer?," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 87(8), pages 518-524.
    2. Eduardo Borensztein & Olivier D Jeanne & Paolo Mauro & Jeronimo Zettelmeyer & Marcos d Chamon, 2005. "Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention," IMF Occasional Papers 237, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Soenke Haeseler, "undated". "Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007-2-1199, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    4. Richards, Anthony & Gugiatti, Mark, 2003. "Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 415-447, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peters Heiko & Ried Stefan & Schwarz Peter, 2011. "Krisenreaktion und Krisenprävention im Euro-Raum: Wandel zum Besseren? / Crisis Mangement and Prevention for the Eurozone: A Change for the Better?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 3-28, January.
    2. Charles B. Blankart, 2011. "An Economic Theory of Switzerland," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(3), pages 74-83, October.
    3. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:3:p:16752115 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:39-59. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfsocea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.