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Wer soll für die Schulden im Bundesstaat haften? Eine vernachlässigte Frage der Föderalismusreform II

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  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Erik R. Fasten

Abstract

Mutual debt liability of the German federal states (Länder) contributed to the large increase of public debt in Germany over the last half century. A commission eager to impose stricter debt limits on state budgets encountered opposition by the Länder. This article proposes the strengthening of the Länder liability for their respective debt in order to disentangle interdependencies between state layers. A recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling is analyzed which sharply reduced bailout expectations of Länder and hence allows for the evolution of new institutions such as public bonds with collective action clauses as intermediate institutions towards strict bankruptcy procedures.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles B. Blankart & Erik R. Fasten, 2009. "Wer soll für die Schulden im Bundesstaat haften? Eine vernachlässigte Frage der Föderalismusreform II," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 10(1), pages 39-59, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:perwir:v:10:y:2009:i:1:p:39-59
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2516.2008.00293.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jochimsen, Beate, 2007. "'Staatsschulden ohne Haftung': Eine Option für deutsche Bundesländer?," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 87(8), pages 518-524.
    2. Kenneth Kletzer & Mr. Barry J. Eichengreen & Mr. Ashoka Mody, 2003. "Crisis Resolution: Next Steps," IMF Working Papers 2003/196, International Monetary Fund.
    3. John M. Halstead & Shantaram Hegde & Linda Schmid Klein, 2004. "Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 39(2), pages 293-315, May.
    4. Anthony Richards & Mark Gugiatti, 2003. "Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 415-447, November.
    5. repec:bla:intfin:v:6:y:2003:i:3:p:415-47 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Soenke Haeseler, "undated". "Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2007-2-1199, Berkeley Electronic Press.
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    1. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:3:p:74-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Charles B. Blankart, 2011. "An Economic Theory of Switzerland," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(03), pages 74-82, October.
    3. Peters Heiko & Ried Stefan & Schwarz Peter, 2011. "Krisenreaktion und Krisenprävention im Euro-Raum: Wandel zum Besseren? / Crisis Mangement and Prevention for the Eurozone: A Change for the Better?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 62(1), pages 3-28, January.
    4. Charles B. Blankart & Erik R. Fasten, 2010. "Spare in der Zeit, und Du wirst darben in der Not?Eine deutsche Alternative zum Strukturprogramm der EU-Kommission," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 63(11), pages 13-18, June.
    5. Charles B. Blankart, 2011. "An Economic Theory of Switzerland," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(3), pages 74-83, October.
    6. repec:ces:ifodic:v:9:y:2011:i:3:p:16752115 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Charles B. Blankart, 2011. "Föderalismus, direkte Demokratie und Besteuerung: Eine Theorie der Schweiz," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(12), pages 13-19, July.

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