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The Political Economy of Land Finance in China

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  • Wen Wang
  • Fangzhi Ye

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  • Wen Wang & Fangzhi Ye, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Finance in China," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 91-110, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:36:y:2016:i:2:p:91-110
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wu, Alfred M. & Wang, Wen, 2013. "Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 176-184.
    2. Peterson, George E., 2006. "Land leasing and land sale as an infrastructure-financing option," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4043, The World Bank.
    3. Guangzhong Cao & Changchun Feng & Ran Tao, 2008. "Local “Land Finance” in China's Urban Expansion: Challenges and Solutions," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 16(2), pages 19-30, March.
    4. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    5. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    7. Jieming Zhu, 2005. "A Transitional Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(8), pages 1369-1390, July.
    8. Nancy H. Chau & Weiwen Zhang, 2011. "Harnessing the Forces of Urban Expansion: The Public Economics of Farmland Development Allowances," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 87(3), pages 488-507.
    9. Fubing Su & Ran Tao & Lu Xi & Ming Li, 2012. "Local Officials' Incentives and China's Economic Growth: Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 20(4), pages 1-18, July.
    10. Heller, Peter S, 1975. "A Model of Public Fiscal Behavior in Developing Countries: Aid, Investment, and Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 429-445, June.
    11. De Wang & Li Zhang & Zhao Zhang & Simon Xiaobin Zhao, 2011. "Urban Infrastructure Financing in Reform-era China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 48(14), pages 2975-2998, November.
    12. Huang, Yasheng, 1996. "Central-local relations in china during the reform era: The economic and institutional dimensions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 655-672, April.
    13. Sheng,Yumin, 2010. "Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in China," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521195386, Enero-Abr.
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