Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection
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Other versions of this item:
- Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Broll, Udo, 1986. "Collateral in Banking Policy and Adverse Selection," MPRA Paper 18709, University Library of Munich, Germany.
References listed on IDEAS
- Baltensperger, Ernst, 1978. "Credit Rationing: Issues and Questions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 170-183, May.
- Smith, Bruce, 1983. "Limited Information, Credit Rationing, and Optimal Government Lending Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 305-318, June.
- Wette, Hildegard C, 1983. "Collateral in Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information: Note," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 442-445, June.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
- Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1970. "Increasing risk: I. A definition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 225-243, September.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
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Cited by:
- Gilroy, Bernard Michael & Broll, Udo, 1988. "Market Behaviour, Information Asymmetries and Product Qualities," MPRA Paper 18655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
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