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The 2007–13 Financial Perspective: Domination of National Interests

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  • VASJA RANT
  • MOJMIR MRAK

Abstract

This article confirms the validity of the hypothesis that national interests were the driving force behind the process and outcome of negotiations for the EU's next financial perspective for 2007–13. The hypothesis is tested by comparing hypothetical coalitions based on quantified national interests (partial net budgetary balances) and the actual (documented) coalitions. Based on these results, the article also discusses implications of the ‘net balances problem’ for the 2008/09 EU budget review.

Suggested Citation

  • Vasja Rant & Mojmir Mrak, 2010. "The 2007–13 Financial Perspective: Domination of National Interests," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(2), pages 347-372, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:48:y:2010:i:2:p:347-372
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02055.x
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