Management Going-concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation
"The UK regulatory requirements relating to going-concern disclosures require directors to report on the going-concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially-distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going-concern cases over the period 1994-2000. We find that whereas auditors' going-concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going-concern uncertainties directors' going-concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going-concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions." Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2006)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
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