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Which governance characteristics affect the incidence of divestitures in Australia?

Author

Listed:
  • Pascal Nguyen

    (Axe 2 (2011-2016) : « Marchés, Cultures de consommation, Autonomie et Migrations » (MSHS Poitiers) - MSHS de Poitiers [Maison des sciences de l'homme et de la société de Poitiers] - Maison des sciences humaines et sociales de Poitiers [USR 3565] - UP - Université de Poitiers = University of Poitiers - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UTS - University of Technology Sydney)

  • Nahid Rahman

    (UTS - University of Technology Sydney)

Abstract

Event studies indicate that divestitures create shareholder value. However, managers are generally disinclined to execute a divestiture due to their inherent preferences for growing the firm's assets. Governance structures can play a significant role in restraining this agency conflict. Using a sample of divestitures carried out by Australian firms over a recent 10-year period, we find that board compensation and ownership concentration increase the likelihood of a divestiture. In addition, board compensation has a stronger effect in firms that are more likely to divest, while larger boards inhibit divestitures in firms that are less likely to divest. Our analysis involves a propensity score matching method. We show that poor matching can lead to large biases and inconsistencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Pascal Nguyen & Nahid Rahman, 2014. "Which governance characteristics affect the incidence of divestitures in Australia?," Post-Print halshs-01370690, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01370690
    DOI: 10.1177/0312896213517517
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Guy Schofield, 2020. "Evidence of governance arbitrage by private equity sponsors," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 971-1005, April.
    3. Bakar, Intan Suryani Abu & Khan, Arifur & Mather, Paul & Tanewski, George, 2018. "Corporate boards and performance pricing in private debt contracts," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 144-162.
    4. Christofer Adrian & Sue Wright, 2020. "Perceptions of shareholders and directors on corporate governance: what we learn about director primacy," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 1209-1236, April.
    5. Pamela Kent & Kim Kercher & James Routledge, 2018. "Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 58(2), pages 445-475, June.
    6. Natalie Elms & Pamela Fae Kent, 2023. "Nomination committees in Australia, outcomes for influence of a powerful CEO and diversity," Journal of Accounting Literature, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 46(4), pages 481-509, July.
    7. Kebin Deng & Zhong Ding & Yushu Zhu & Qing Zhou & Kathy Walsh, 2017. "Investment–cash flow sensitivity measures investment thirst, but not financial constraint," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 57(1), pages 165-197, March.
    8. Sharon Teitler‐Regev & Tchai Tavor, 2023. "The effect of Airbnb announcements on hotel stock prices," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(1), pages 78-100, March.
    9. Balasingham Balachandran & Sutharson Kanapathippillai & Chandrasekhar Krishnamurti & Michael Theobald & Eswaran Velayutham, 2017. "The issuance of warrants in rights offerings: Agency costs and signaling effects," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 42(4), pages 608-636, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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