IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ehsrev/v60y2007i3p513-544.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Serfdom and social capital in Bohemia and Russia1

Author

Listed:
  • T. K. DENNISON
  • SHEILAGH OGILVIE

Abstract

The ‘horizontal’ social capital generated by networks and communities is widely regarded as inherently antagonistic to ‘vertical’ hierarchies such as serfdom. This article examines this view using evidence from pre‐Emancipation Bohemia and Russia. It finds that serf communes generated a substantial ‘social capital’ of shared norms, common information, and collective sanctions. But communal social capital was manipulated by village elites who collaborated with overlords in taxation, land regulation, and demographic control. This benefited communal oligarchies, but harmed ordinary serfs and the wider economy. Horizontal social capital and vertical hierarchies, the article demonstrates, can as easily collude as conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • T. K. Dennison & Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "Serfdom and social capital in Bohemia and Russia1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 60(3), pages 513-544, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:60:y:2007:i:3:p:513-544
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00373.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00373.x
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2006.00373.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    2. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    3. Klaus Deininger, 2003. "Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 15125, April.
    4. Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2003. "A Bitter Living: Women, Markets, and Social Capital in Early Modern Germany," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198205548.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Klein & Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2016. "Occupational structure in the Czech lands under the second serfdom," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 69(2), pages 493-521, May.
    2. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2022. "Economics and history: Analyzing serfdom," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _200, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Guinnane, Timothy W. & Ogilvie, Sheilagh, 2008. "Institutions and Demographic Responses to Shocks: Wuttemberg, 1634-1870," Center Discussion Papers 5977, Yale University, Economic Growth Center.
    4. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2012. "Choices and Constraints in the Pre-Industrial Countryside," Working Papers 1, Department of Economic and Social History at the University of Cambridge, revised 01 Jan 2012.
    5. Helen Paul, 2015. "Editorial: Women in economic and social history: twenty-fifth anniversary of the Women's Committee of the Economic History Society," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(2), pages 1-17, May.
    6. Sheilagh Ogilvie, 2007. "'Whatever Is, Is Right'?, Economic Institutions in Pre-Industrial Europe (Tawney Lecture 2006)," CESifo Working Paper Series 2066, CESifo.
    7. Ogilvie, Sheilagh & Carus, A.W., 2014. "Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 8, pages 403-513, Elsevier.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5135 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ishita Chatterjee & Ranjan Ray, 2009. "Crime, Corruption and Institutions," Monash Economics Working Papers 20-09, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Pande, Rohini, 2008. "Understanding Political Corruption in Low Income Countries," Handbook of Development Economics, in: T. Paul Schultz & John A. Strauss (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 50, pages 3155-3184, Elsevier.
    4. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    5. Ishita Chatterjee & Ranjan Ray, 2013. "The Role of Institutions in the Incidence of Crime and Corruption," Economics Discussion / Working Papers 13-17, The University of Western Australia, Department of Economics.
    6. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.
    7. Grimm, M. & Klasen, S., 2007. "Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level," ISS Working Papers - General Series 18745, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    8. Foley-Fisher, Nathan & McLaughlin, Eoin, 2016. "Capitalising on the Irish land question: land reform and state banking in Ireland, 1891–1938," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 71-109, April.
    9. Lenyeletse V. Basupi & Claire H. Quinn & Andrew J. Dougill, 2017. "Pastoralism and Land Tenure Transformation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Conflicting Policies and Priorities in Ngamiland, Botswana," Land, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-17, December.
    10. Thomas Vendryes, 2014. "Peasants Against Private Property Rights: A Review Of The Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 971-995, December.
    11. Leakey, Roger & Kranjac-Berisavljevic, Gordana & Caron, Patrick & Craufurd, Peter & Martin, Adrienne M. & McDonald, Andy & Abedini, Walter & Afiff, Suraya & Bakurin, Ndey & Bass, Steve & Hilbeck, Ange, 2009. "Impacts of AKST on development and sustainability goals," Book Chapters,, International Water Management Institute.
    12. Bouquet, Emmanuelle, 2009. "State-Led Land Reform and Local Institutional Change: Land Titles, Land Markets and Tenure Security in Mexican Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1390-1399, August.
    13. Bravo-Ortega, Claudio & Lederman, Daniel, 2005. "Agriculture and national welfare around the world: causality and international heterogeneity since 1960," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3499, The World Bank.
    14. Elias Danyi Kuusaana & Nicolas Gerber, 2015. "Institutional Synergies in Customary Land Markets—Selected Case Studies of Large-Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLAs) in Ghana," Land, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-27, September.
    15. Santos, Florence & Fletschner, Diana & Savath, Vivien & Peterman, Amber, 2014. "Can Government-Allocated Land Contribute to Food Security? Intrahousehold Analysis of West Bengal’s Microplot Allocation Program," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 860-872.
    16. Susanne Väth & Michael Kirk, 2014. "Do property rights and contract farming matter for rural development? Evidence from a large-scale investment in Ghana," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201416, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    17. Ghebru, Hosaena, 2015. "Is There a Merit to the Continuum Tenure Approach? A Case of Demand for Land Rights Formulation in Rural Mozambique," 2015 Conference, August 9-14, 2015, Milan, Italy 211683, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    18. Rabah Arezki & Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, 2015. "What Drives the Global "Land Rush"?," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 29(2), pages 207-233.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ehsrev:v:60:y:2007:i:3:p:513-544. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ehsukea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.