IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecorec/v86y2010is1p115-123.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Are Older Workers Less Productive? A Case Study of Aged Care Workers in Australia

Author

Listed:
  • ZHANG WEI
  • SUE RICHARDSON

Abstract

Employers are reluctant to employ older workers. Is this because they are less productive than equivalent younger workers? This paper uses data from a 2007 census of residential aged care homes in Australia to examine the productivity differentials of workers at different ages. We estimate production functions that take into account the age profile of the workforce in each aged care residential facility. We find that for the facilities having high care residents only, the productivity of nurses, whose work is more demanding of specialist knowledge, keeps increasing with age while the rate of increase declines after age 50. In contrast, the productivity of carers, whose work is more demanding of physical capacity, is highest in middle age. The facilities with low care residents only provide a much lower level of services because their residents are less frail and more independent. In this case, none of the coefficients regarding the impacts of age on productivity is statistically significant - suggesting that older workers are good substitutes for younger ones. Copyright © 2010 The Economic Society of Australia.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang Wei & Sue Richardson, 2010. "Are Older Workers Less Productive? A Case Study of Aged Care Workers in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(s1), pages 115-123, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:86:y:2010:i:s1:p:115-123
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=ecor&volume=86&issue=s1&year=2010&part=null
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey, 1992. "Noisy Observation in Adverse Selection Models," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(3), pages 595-615.
    2. Carlier, Guillaume, 2001. "A general existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, February.
    3. Jean-Charles Rochet & Philippe Chone, 1998. "Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(4), pages 783-826, July.
    4. Basov Suren, 2003. "Incentives for Boundedly Rational Agents," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-16, June.
    5. Guesnerie, Roger & Picard, Pierre & Rey, Patrick, 1989. "Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 807-823, April.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    7. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne.
    8. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
    9. Picard, Pierre, 1987. "On the design of incentive schemes under moral hazard and adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 305-331.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:86:y:2010:i:s1:p:115-123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/esausea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.