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Repeated Games and Reputations: Long‐run Relationships ‐ by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson


  • Damien S Eldridge


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  • Damien S Eldridge, 2008. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long‐run Relationships ‐ by George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 84(264), pages 128-129, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:84:y:2008:i:264:p:128-129
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2008.00451.x

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Robert J. Aumann, 1995. "Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011476, September.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, September.
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