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Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Dhruva Kartik

    (University of Southern California)

  • Ashutosh Nayyar

    (University of Southern California)

Abstract

A general model for zero-sum stochastic games with asymmetric information is considered. In this model, each player’s information at each time can be divided into a common information part and a private information part. Under certain conditions on the evolution of the common and private information, a dynamic programming characterization of the value of the game (if it exists) is presented. If the value of the zero-sum game does not exist, then the dynamic program provides bounds on the upper and lower values of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • Dhruva Kartik & Ashutosh Nayyar, 2021. "Upper and Lower Values in Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Asymmetric Information," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 363-388, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:11:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-020-00364-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-020-00364-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rahul Chandan & Keith Paarporn & Mahnoosh Alizadeh & Jason R. Marden, 2022. "Strategic investments in multi-stage General Lotto games," Papers 2209.06090, arXiv.org.

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