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Echo Chambers: Voter‐to‐Voter Communication and Political Competition

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  • Monica A. Giovanniello

Abstract

I study how strategic communication among voters shapes both political outcomes and parties' advertising strategies in a model of informative campaign advertising. I show that echo chambers arise endogenously as a product of strategic communication. Surprisingly, a small ideological distance between voters is not sufficient to guarantee that a chamber is created, biases' direction plays a crucial role.

Suggested Citation

  • Monica A. Giovanniello, 2025. "Echo Chambers: Voter‐to‐Voter Communication and Political Competition," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 752-768, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:37:y:2025:i:2:p:752-768
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12338
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Levy, Gilat & Razin, Ronny, 2019. "Echo chambers and their effects on economic and political outcomes," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 101413, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    5. Stephen Coate, 2004. "Political Competition with Campaign Contributions and Informative Advertising," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 772-804, September.
    6. repec:plo:pone00:0022656 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, 2010. "What Drives Media Slant? Evidence From U.S. Daily Newspapers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 35-71, January.
    8. Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2019. "Echo Chambers and Their Effects on Economic and Political Outcomes," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 11(1), pages 303-328, August.
    9. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
    10. Ole Jann & Christoph Schottmuller, 2018. "Why Echo Chambers are Useful," Economics Series Working Papers 857, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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