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Central Banks: From Politically Independent To Market‐Dependent Institutions

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  • Pedro Schwartz
  • Juan Castañeda

Abstract

Responses to the financial crisis are undermining the Chinese walls painfully built between monetary and fiscal authorities. Central banks and state treasuries are working side by side as lenders of last resort. Central banks are helping economic ministers with purchases of public debt and discounting of private paper. Regulation and control of financial institutions is now a political football. Central banks must be seen again as market‐dependent institutions in a world of currency competition. Privatisation in law or in fact is back on the table.

Suggested Citation

  • Pedro Schwartz & Juan Castañeda, 2009. "Central Banks: From Politically Independent To Market‐Dependent Institutions," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(3), pages 9-16, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecaffa:v:29:y:2009:i:3:p:9-16
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2009.01912.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Patrick Artus & Alan S. Blinder & Willem Buiter & Robert M. Solow & Otmar Issing, 2008. "Round Table Discussion: Monetary Policy in the New International Environment," Chapters, in: Jean-Philippe Touffut (ed.), Central Banks as Economic Institutions, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. John B. Taylor, 2007. "Housing and monetary policy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 463-476.
    3. Charles Goodhart, 1988. "The Evolution of Central Banks," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262570734, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Malte Tobias Kähler, 2011. "From German Rules to European Discretion: Policy’s Slippery Slope," Chapters, in: David Howden (ed.), Institutions in Crisis, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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