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Strategic behavior, artistic integrity, and tradeoffs in popular music

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  • Andrew Weinbach
  • Phillip Kamau Njoroge
  • Robert Salvino
  • Arch Woodside

Abstract

This study examines market concentration's influence on popular music. The data cover popular music from weekly Billboard Hot 100 songs from 1952 to 1989, for which song characteristic data including tempo and duration is available from the Million Song Dataset (MSD). Greater market concentration of the top four artists is found to impact song length, with longer #1 songs and shorter songs in the #2 through #10 spots on the Billboard charts. However, tests for alterations in song construction by top artists that might indicate a form of “sell‐out” behavior do not reveal evidence of it.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrew Weinbach & Phillip Kamau Njoroge & Robert Salvino & Arch Woodside, 2024. "Strategic behavior, artistic integrity, and tradeoffs in popular music," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 42(3), pages 483-497, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:42:y:2024:i:3:p:483-497
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12649
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    References listed on IDEAS

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