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The Role of the State in Balancing the Minimum Wage in Turkey and the USA

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  • Rüya Gökhan Koçer
  • Jelle Visser

Abstract

In this article, the direct role of the state in industrial relations is scrutinized by focusing on the political basis of decisions regarding the minimum wage. We argue that in order to ensure stability and growth, any state must balance the interests of capital and labour when taking this kind of distributional decision. This idea is operationalized using O'Connor's concepts of accumulation and legitimation as the basis for an analytical model. Application to Turkey and comparison with the USA reveals that in Turkey, governments take account of legitimacy concerns in their minimum wage decisions due to the large number of workers directly dependent on minimum wages and weak collective bargaining institutions. In the USA, despite rather similar industrial relations conditions, this tendency is not present, probably due to the much smaller number of minimum wage earners and their weakness in the political process. However, in the USA, too, we observe that there is a difference between political parties and historical periods in the way in which the minimum wage is determined.

Suggested Citation

  • Rüya Gökhan Koçer & Jelle Visser, 2009. "The Role of the State in Balancing the Minimum Wage in Turkey and the USA," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 47(2), pages 349-370, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:349-370
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8543.2009.00730.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keech,William R., 1995. "Economic Politics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521462068, September.
    2. Keech,William R., 1995. "Economic Politics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521467681, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ayça Akarçay Gürbüz & Sezgin Polat, 2016. "Public--private wage differentials in Turkey: public policy or market dynamics?," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 326-356, May.
    2. Dr. Nickolaos Giovanis, 2018. "Determining Factors of Minimum Wage in the Member States of the OECD," Sumerianz Journal of Business Management and Marketing, Sumerianz Publication, vol. 1(4), pages 93-101, 12-2018.
    3. Dr. Nickolaos Giovanis, 2019. "“Determining Factors of Minimum Wage in the Member States of the OECDâ€," Sumerianz Journal of Business Management and Marketing, Sumerianz Publication, vol. 2(1), pages 6-14, 01-2019.
    4. Ozan Bakis & Sezgin Polat, 2023. "Wage inequality dynamics in Turkey," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 50(3), pages 657-694, August.
    5. Damian Grimshaw & Gerhard Bosch & Jill Rubery, 2014. "Minimum Wages and Collective Bargaining: What Types of Pay Bargaining Can Foster Positive Pay Equity Outcomes?," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 52(3), pages 470-498, September.
    6. Calavrezo, Oana & Pelek, Selin, 2011. "Qui sont les salariés payés au niveau du salaire minimum? Une analyse empirique à partir de données turques," GIAM Working Papers 11-2, Galatasaray University Economic Research Center, revised 13 Feb 2011.

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