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Who Controls Selection under ‘Voluntary’ Redundancy? The Case of the Redundant Mineworkers Payments Scheme

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  • Victoria Wass

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  • Victoria Wass, 1996. "Who Controls Selection under ‘Voluntary’ Redundancy? The Case of the Redundant Mineworkers Payments Scheme," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 34(2), pages 249-265, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:34:y:1996:i:2:p:249-265
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1996.tb00651.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-380, October.
    2. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-1284, December.
    3. Booth, Alison L, 1995. "Layoffs with Payoffs: A Bargaining Model of Union Wage and Severance Pay Determination," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 62(248), pages 551-564, November.
    4. Booth, Alison & Chatterji, Monojit, 1989. "Redundancy Payments and Firm-Specific Training," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(224), pages 505-521, November.
    5. Bernard Casey, 1992. "Redundancy and Early Retirement: The Interaction of Public and Private Policy in Britain, Germany and the USA," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 425-443, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karlsson, Tobias, 2012. "Workforce Reductions in Theory and Practice: The Swedish Tobacco Monopoly in the 1920s," MPRA Paper 39235, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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