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Birth of the Modern Corporation: From Servant of the State to Semi†Sovereign Power

Author

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  • Luigi Cerri

Abstract

It is widely known that large business corporations have accumulated enormous political and economic power since the early 20th century. They not only create barriers to entry to small firms in the economic domain, they also pose a serious threat to democracy by dominating public discourse and occupying a wide range of public spaces. Efforts to halt or reverse the growth of corporate power have been largely ineffective, in large part because they have been entirely reactive. In order for citizens to reclaim the economy and politics, a new strategy is necessary, one that starts by analyzing the source of corporate power. The method of analysis in this article is historical, specifically the history of changes in the United States of the legal instruments of incorporation and their relationship to emerging conditions in the economy and business. In the first half of the 19th century, corporations were chartered by state governments to carry out public benefit activities, particularly infrastructure projects. These mixed corporations lost favor during the depression of the 1840s and were replaced by private for†profit corporations that continued using the same debt financing instruments employed by states. They were also still regulated by the states that issued their charters. When corporations sought to avoid competition by creating cartels, they had difficulty maintaining discipline and discovered they needed new rights in order to gain permanent control of markets. In the 1890s, they were granted the status of “natural persons,†with the legal protections of citizens, but they also gained the right to buy other corporations, thereby solidifying their market power and making them largely autonomous from public control. Each transition was contested, but when it was completed, it seemed to the public as if corporations had always had their new powers. In order to regain the power to hold corporations accountable to the public, those old contested issues need to be brought back into public discourse, so that citizens might decide for themselves how much power corporations should have.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Cerri, 2018. "Birth of the Modern Corporation: From Servant of the State to Semi†Sovereign Power," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(2), pages 239-277, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:77:y:2018:i:2:p:239-277
    DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12212
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    References listed on IDEAS

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