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Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information

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  • Jodie Nelson
  • Gerry Gallery
  • Majella Percy

Abstract

We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001-2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements' continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders' Association) and regulatory intervention. Copyright (c) 2010 The Authors. Accounting and Finance (c) 2010 AFAANZ.

Suggested Citation

  • Jodie Nelson & Gerry Gallery & Majella Percy, 2010. "Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option information," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 50(3), pages 685-717.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:50:y:2010:i:3:p:685-717
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    File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00339.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Anne M. Wilkins & Dana R. Hermanson & Jeffrey R. Cohen, 2016. "Do Compensation Committee Members Perceive Changing CEO Incentive Performance Targets Mid-Cycle to be Fair?," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 623-638, September.
    2. repec:kap:jbuset:v:142:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10551-015-2752-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kanapathippillai, Sutharson & Johl, Shireenjit K. & Wines, Graeme, 2016. "Remuneration committee effectiveness and narrative remuneration disclosure," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 384-402.
    4. Eduardo Schiehll & Paulo Terra & Fernanda Victor, 2013. "Determinants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazil," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(2), pages 331-361, May.
    5. Ala’ Hussein Albawwat & Mohamad Yazis Ali Basah, 2015. "The Impact of Shariah Approved Companies on the Relationship between Corporate Governance Structure and Voluntary Disclosure of Interim Financial Reporting in Jordan," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 5(2), pages 66-85, April.
    6. Chiraz Ben Ali, 2014. "Corporate Governance, Principal-Principal Agency Conflicts, and Disclosure," Working Papers 2014-125, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    7. Simona Catuogno & Sara Saggese & Fabrizia Sarto & Riccardo Viganò, 2016. "Shedding light on the aim of stock options: a literature review," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(2), pages 387-411, June.

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